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One of the most influential approaches to the understanding of contemporary 
socio-spatial organization is that which emphasises the emergence of a 
‘knowledge economy’. The knowledge economy highlights the increasing 
importance of the informational content of goods and services, the 
mobilization of knowledge in the production process, the occupational trends 
towards professionalisation, the commercialization of knowledge and the 
sectoral shift from an economy based on the manufacturing of industrial goods 
by production workers to one based on the design of informational goods and 
services by knowledge workers (Reich, 1991; Castells, 1997; Jessop, 2000).  
 
This informational form of capitalism is also linked to socio-spatial change and 
particularly the rise of a global economy, spanning local and national borders 
and apparently operating on a planetary scale (Giddens, 1990). Furthermore, 
this global informational capitalism is also characterized by new organizational 
forms, typically captured under the loose rubric of ‘network’ forms of 
organisation (Freeman and Louca, 2000), and new patterns of socio-spatial 
inequality, linked in part to the ‘digital divide’ but reaching more broadly into 
the restructuring of work, employment and social reproduction.  
 
We examine a number of key questions regarding this knowledge economy. 
First, we look at the origin of the concept as well as early attempts to define 
and map the knowledge economy empirically. Second, we examine a variety of 
perspectives on the socio-spatial organisation of the knowledge economy and 
approaches which link techno-economic change and social-spatial organisation. 
Building on a critique of these perspectives, we then go on to develop a view of 
a knowledge economy that is contested along each stage of the process of the 
production, use, ownership and transformation of knowledge. We show that 
these struggles occur both globally and locally and are crucial forces shaping 
contemporary socio-spatial organisation. Finally, we briefly discuss the 
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emergent patterns of socio-spatial inequality associated with this politically 
constructed knowledge economy. 
 
Origins of the Knowledge Economy: Empirical and Conceptual  
 
For many people the US was the first information/knowledge economy. This 
view has its theoretical and empirical origins in the work done by Fritz 
Machlup (1962) and his study of the economic contribution of the knowledge 
and information industries to the US economy. Machlup recategorised national 
statistical data and found that information industries accounted for almost 29 
percent of the adjusted Gross National Product (GNP) in 1958 and that 
information occupations accounted for 32.4 percent of total employee 
compensation.  
 
Machlup has been credited with founding the ‘economics of information and 
knowledge’ sub-discipline. For him information and knowledge were 
intrinsically related but nevertheless distinct, for while informing can bring 
about knowledge not all information is knowledge. He defined the production 
of knowledge as ‘any human activity effectively designed to create, alter or 
confirm in a human mind – one’s own or anyone else’s – a meaningful 
apperception, awareness, cognisance or consciousness of whatever it may be’ 
(1962:30). His taxonomy of knowledge was broad and included knowledge 
outside the formal economy, although he admitted that he could not measure 
the contribution of such knowledge to the economy.  
 
Machlup’s approach was replicated by others and these early statistical studies 
of knowledge production highlight significant shifts in terms of employment 
and work from the late 1940s in the US and at varying times in other OECD 
countries. For Machlup and many others the growth of information industries 
and information type jobs was driven by technology, particularly computer 
technology. For others the seeds of these changes were sown further back 
when the technologies of the industrial revolution, like steam and electricity, 
created a demand for communication and automated control (Kumar 2004). 
Overall early mapping studies of the knowledge economy were highly 
problematic in terms of their methodology and one must be careful when using 
their results. They also contained little theoretical or explanatory substance.  
 
More qualitative and theoretical work was done in the 1960s and 1970s by 
sociologists like Daniel Bell. Bell achieved widespread notoriety for this work 
on the ‘post-industrial society’, a term he was later to use interchangeably with 
the information and the knowledge society. His examination of the social 
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structure (defined as the economy, the occupation system and technology) 
found that between 1947 and 1968 service employment grew by almost 60 
percent while growth in manufacturing remained below ten percent in the US. 
Within service employment Bell suggests that automation and technology were 
having an impact not only on the sectors in which people were working but 
also on what they were doing. For Bell these shifts signalled a fundamental 
change whereby economic activities no longer involved man struggling against 
nature but rather involved man and information. He also argued that 
theoretical knowledge was of growing importance as a source of innovation 
and for policy formation. Thus Bell highlights the growing importance of one 
type of knowledge, ‘theoretical knowledge’ in the economy. and for him 
knowledge is defined as ‘what is objectively known, an intellectual property, 
attached to a name or a group of names and certified by copyright or some 
other form of social recognition (e.g. publication)’ (1974:176).  
 
Bell’s work stands as one of the first attempts to offer an explanation for the 
development of a post-industrial knowledge economy. His explanation rests on 
the importance of technology and the crucial role of ‘theoretical knowledge’. 
He has been accused of being a ‘technological determinist’ whose 
understanding of social change is too dependant on the role of technology and 
someone whose work was driven by an implicit assumption that economies 
would converge on the ‘most advanced’ model if the right technologies were 
adopted (Webster, 1995). Indeed one of Bell’s central, and most criticised, 
points was his division of societies into pre-industrial (Asia, Africa, Latin 
America), industrial (Western Europe, Soviet Union, Japan) and post-industrial 
(United States). However he brought a vital focus on the specific importance of 
knowledge, albeit one particular type of knowledge.  
 
Attempts to take techno-economic changes seriously were also evident within 
attempts to locate information and communications technologies within 
broader and more complex histories organised around successive ‘techno-
economic paradigms’, where new technologies became the basis of new 
products and cycles of investment and production, prompting economic and 
social re-organisation (Freeman and Louca, 2000; Perez, 2002).  While there is a 
lingering technological determinism in these studies, the historical locating of 
the knowledge economy and the opportunity for comparison with other 
techno-economic paradigms was of great value in introducing a historical 
dimension that went beyond simple modernisation perspectives.  
 
Increasingly economists and policy makers today believe that technological 
change and investment in new knowledge are important sources of economic 
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growth and key aspects of a knowledge economy. Patent data provides one 
indicator as to the level of new knowledge produced in an economy and 
according to one source it was not until the early 1980s and the 1990s that 
patent data in the US started to accelerate, particularly in new sectors like 
biotechnology and computing (Powell and Snellman, 2004:203). In part this 
may be due to a new more proactive and pro-patent legal and regulatory 
regime, which by all accounts is another key feature of the knowledge 
economy, but in part it may also signal increasing investment in research and 
development in those sectors.  
 
Many economists have become interested in the specific characteristics of 
information, and endogenous growth theory has placed technological change at 
the heart of economic growth. These theorists place investments in human 
capital and research and development at the centre of economic growth and 
suggest that these investments generate increasing returns to the spread of 
technical and business knowledge (Arthur, 1994).  Similarly, economists such as 
Douglas North have picked up Bell’s interest in the underlying logic of social 
transformation that is driving the growth of a knowledge economy. However, 
rather than focus on shifting technologies as Bell did, they located the source of 
the knowledge economy in growing social and organisational complexity, 
creating a need for greater organisational integration of knowledge to manage 
transactions (North, 2005). 
 
Machlup’s challenge to take the expansion of a knowledge economy seriously 
has therefore been taken up, with efforts to identify the characteristics, 
dynamics and history of such an economy. However, in the process, Machlup’s 
own emphasis on the location of commercial and bureaucratic knowledge 
within the broader range of knowledges that are produced everyday in social 
interactions and institutions was lost. The ‘knowledge economy’ has come to 
be seen as unproblematically identified with specific industries, occupations and 
technologies, rather than as a social and political construct. 
 
Socio-Spatial Organisation of the Knowledge Economy 
 
Bell devotes relatively little space to analysing the relationship between 
knowledge, technology and space. In recent years, however, the spatial 
organisation of the knowledge economy has become a focus of much debate in 
human geography and beyond, with a variety of competing concepts of socio-
spatial organisation (Ó Riain, 2006).  
 
Time Space Distanciation 
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Reich (1991) argues that new information and communication technologies 
make it possible and even necessary to reorganize firms into ‘global webs’ and 
employees into global telecommuters. For Reich these webs operate smoothly, 
destroying constraints of space and social structure, moving in conjunction 
with the ever-circling hands of the clocks on the walls of corporate offices 
around the globe. The global workplace is essentially a ‘virtual place’ where the 
constraints of space, social organization and local institutional arrangements 
have been overcome. The politics of the workplace is replaced by a virtual 
space of knowledge sharing and creation, particularly for ‘knowledge workers’ 
such as software developers. Space is dis-embedded while control of the labour 
process is essentially cooperative.  
 
Reich’s analysis of the process of globalization is compatible with that of 
Giddens (1990) who argues that globalization occurs through a process of time-
space distanciation - where time and space are universalized and ‘lifted out’ or 
made independent of their immediate contexts. For Reich the global workplace 
is dis-embedded from its temporal and spatial contexts and becomes a ‘pure’ 
space for communication and innovation among employees. Giddens’ analysis 
casts light on how this is possible. He argues that communication across 
distance depends upon the existence of expert systems, or systems of 
knowledge which actors understand and trust (such as the technical language of 
high tech industry), and upon symbolic tokens, or media of communication 
that can serve as coordinating mechanisms for long-distance social relations 
where social cues and monitoring are absent or opaque (e.g. money). So for 
these analysts the knowledge economy and its technologies are central to both 
the content and circulation of the new economy. However, technological 
determinism once again rears its head in this work. For Reich, symbolic analysts 
get rewarded fairly for their skills and knowledge, and all types of knowledge 
are evaluated fairly – the politics of the recognition and rewarding of 
knowledge are neglected. Giddens’  emphasis on symbolic media and expert 
systems opens up the possibility of analyzing how the organization of these 
media shape the knowledge economy itself. However, in Giddens’ work these 
are seen simply as carriers of information rather than as contested fields of 
socio-spatial structuring of the knowledge economy.  
 
 
Time Space Compression 
 
Other authors have portrayed a fundamentally different global workplace 
where ‘globalism’ - whether it is the ability to create virtual connections or to 
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become increasingly mobile across the globe - is distributed unequally. Harvey 
(1989) argues that time and space have not become distanciated as Giddens 
claims, but that mobile capital and corporations have colonized local spaces 
and time has annihilated space in a process of time-space compression. 
Corporations assert their control over technological change through shaping 
the trajectory of research and its goals, and protecting their ‘intellectual 
property rights’ and monopolies of the means of communication. The promise 
of global communications creating an ‘electronic republic’ is undermined by 
commericalisation, corporate dominance and media concentration (McChesney 
et al. 1997). 
 
Such a perspective rightly draws our attention to the critical importance of 
corporate power and capitalist social organization in shaping the knowledge 
economy, particularly given the growing global media oligopolies, the decline of 
public service media and the commericalisation of the Internet. However, it 
blinds us to the ongoing dependence of capitalists themselves upon the 
knowledge production of workers and citizens, suggesting that there is a much 
greater field of struggle and contestation within the knowledge economy than 
these analyses suggest. An emphasis on time space compression crucially 
directs our attention to corporate power in the knowledge economy but 
overstates the degree to which capitalists can secure control over knowledge 
and underestimates the various struggles and negotiations that are taking place 
within the knowledge economy 
 
Time Space Embedding 
 
Differ though they may on the degree of capitalist domination of the ‘space of 
flows’, both of these theories of time space distanciation and compression 
agree that globalization is increasingly disembedding the globalised economy 
and workplace from their local contexts. Other theorists have argued however 
that the demands for increased flexibility and specialized learning in the 
knowledge economy actually make embedding the global workplace in local 
spaces even more critical. Efficient production and constant innovation require 
the construction of shared physical spaces where workers can interact and 
communicate on a face-to-face basis and where shared goals and meanings can 
be created and maintained (Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1997). Global 
competitiveness is therefore dependent on increased spatial embeddedness. 
The local spaces which can achieve this happy state of affairs will be able to 
buffer themselves somewhat from the demands of globalism because they 
possess territorially specific and unique institutional and cultural capacities – 
although the importance of social interaction will often promote new forms of 
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global organization, such as transnational technical communities (Saxenian, 
2006). Global workplaces are deeply embedded in these territorially and 
temporally specific contexts under a process that might be called time-space 
embedding.  
 
However, while recognising the spatial embeddedness of the knowledge 
economy is a vital contribution, these perspectives tend to neglect how this 
spatial embedding is itself shaped by power structures around innovation and 
knowledge, and focus on the process of innovation and knowledge creation 
rather than the politics of realising the returns to knowledge.  
 
The Knowledge Economy as Embedded and Politically Contested 
 
This section argues for a view of the knowledge economy as organised, 
politically constructed and contested through local and global networks and 
accountabilities. We suggest that it is crucial to examine the struggles along the 
entire chain of technology production and use (Kerr, 2006) and argue that two 
crucial dynamics of the knowledge economy are (1) the struggle between the 
‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘knowledge society’ over the scope and 
boundaries of valuable and valued knowledge and knowledge work; and (2) the 
social shaping of technology production and use within the knowledge 
economy itself.  
 
How does the Knowledge Economy Emerge from the Knowledge Society? 
 
We can identify a relatively distinct sphere of the knowledge economy, based 
around ‘knowledge embodied in commercialised media’ including silicon chips, 
software programmes, games, media broadcasts, consultancy reports, and other 
relatively cosmopolitan forms of knowledge. These commericalised forms and 
media of knowledge, and the activities associated with their production and 
use, are the core of contemporary capital accumulation in the knowledge 
economy. However, they remain embedded in a wider process of knowledge 
production that is intensified by the movement towards occupations based on 
working on people, relationships, organisations – work that was often in the 
past done within the household.   
 
At the core of the creation of the knowledge economy is a deep conflict over 
property rights – with a contest between a regime based on ‘property rights 
imperialism’ and one based on a ‘shared global digital infrastructure’ (Weber 
and Bussell, 2005). In the first, “the Northern corporations that currently 
dominate global ownership of intangible assets successfully defend their 
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politically protected monopoly rights while simultaneously extending those 
rights by transforming into private property an ever larger set of ideas,  
information, and images previously considered part of nature or a shared 
cultural heritage. In the other scenario, property rights are restructured along 
the lines pioneered by the open-source software community to create a “new 
commons” of productive tools which allows for both a more egalitarian 
redistribution of intangible assets and a wider, more effective engagement of 
human ingenuity for creating innovative solutions” (Evans, 2005: 86).  
 
The outcome of the conflict between these regimes is not a technologically 
determinist matter of whether information wants to be ‘free’ or ‘expensive’ 
(Weber and Bussell, 2005) – it is a matter of political contestation. A crucial 
component of analyses of the knowledge economy then will be the analysis of 
this contested terrain of global technology production and business networks 
(Preston, 2001), the growth of high tech regions and transnational technical 
communities (Saxenian, 2006), the role of new forms of state 
developmentalisms (Ó Riain, 2004) and the negotiation of intellectual property 
regimes through international institutions such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the EU’s Lisbon Agenda and the role of the OECD in 
promoting the concept of the ‘new economy’ (Godin, 2004).  
 
What are the Politics of Knowledge Production and Use? 
 
Robert Reich’s ‘symbolic analysts’ that produce the knowledge economy are as 
subject to the politics of the workplace as any other workers.  These workers 
work in a variety of settings and their workplaces are subject to a variety of 
different conflicts – that may, crucially, shape the outcome of their work 
(Barley and Orr, 1997; Barnes et al, 1996; Ó Riain, 2000). These workers work 
within informal compromises, forged between the technical communities that 
develop the technological standards and innovations and the lead technology 
firms that hold the intellectual property rights to many of those innovations. 
Such technical communities and cultures have long been central to processes of 
scientific development (Carroll, 2006). However, despite the variety of studies 
of knowledge production, we lack an ongoing dialogue between students of 
work, science and technology design that might articulate this more complex 
perspective on how the conditions of knowledge production shape knowledge 
itself.  
 
Similarly, social scientists from Adam Smith to Frederick Taylor and on to 
Harry Braverman have long viewed technology as a source of automation and 
deskilling, whether for better or worse. However, more complex 
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understandings of technology use have emerged that emphasise how the 
politics of technology adoption and use shape and effect workers’ skill, 
knowledge and autonomy – and whether that work is ‘automated’ or 
‘informated’ (Zuboff, 1984). Even within the knowledge economy itself, it is 
those clerical workers who do the routine testing and processing of 
programmes and data that are the most vulnerable to exploitation, while 
knowledge producers are more likely to combine employee involvement with 
performance pay structures (Frenkel et al, 2000; Benner, 2002).  For many, 
these concerns with the social effects of technology in the workplace and 
beyond have led back to questions of design – and the crucial importance of 
user involvement in the knowledge production process (Oudshoorn and Pinch, 
2003).  
 
The Politics of Knowledge: Intensifying Time and Space? 
 
Ó Riain (2006) argues that the knowledge economy is characterized not by the 
dis-embedding of time and space but by time-space intensification. Interactions 
between exploitation and embedding intensify time with more rapid rates of 
change in technologies, product markets and organizational structures; 
increased turbulence, turnover and mobility in the labour market; the 
importance of deadlines in work organization; and a revolution in expectations 
of time and a shortening of time horizons. The intensification of space is not just a 
matter of the increased importance of face-to-face interaction or of 
competition between places but of the increasing importance of the ability to 
mobilize space as a resource in social relations in the face of pressures from the 
capitalist market. While this mobilization of space can promote 
competitiveness in the market, it must also be protected from the pressures of 
marketisation which will erode the very social relations upon which it is based. 
Ultimately, the intensification of space raises, over and over again in concrete 
social relations, the deep tension between market and society and opens up 
political spaces for contesting and reconfiguring capitalist social relations.  
 
New Patterns of Social and Spatial Inequality 
 
Academics and analysts differ both in the role they attribute to technology in 
the process of social change and in their assessment of the socio-spatial 
implications of these changes. For Castells while some people in certain 
countries are networked and connected, many countries are predominantly 
disconnected from global networks (Rantanen, 2005:145; Zook, 2005; Dodge 
and Kitchin, 2004). The continued dominance of developed countries and 
cities in the global knowledge economy is most evident in the global 
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governance of the internet and the location of the governing body of domain 
names, ICANN, and ten of the thirteen top level domain name servers in the 
US. The fact that this situation remained unchanged following considerable 
opposition at the Tunis round of the World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) points to continuing inequalities in the global distribution of 
information and knowledge (Rossiter, 2005).  
 
While the distribution and control of knowledge is unevenly distributed it 
appears that not all economies conform to the trajectory of development 
assumed by scholars from developed nations and even where there has been a 
shift to knowledge based industries and occupations the results are not always 
benign. Certain economies still exist which are largely dependant on agriculture 
and natural raw materials and in other places growth in information industries 
has been accompanied by significant growth in unemployment and 
underemployment (Arriaga, 1985). Indeed studies of knowledge work have 
found little change in the types of work or management of work carried out in 
these new industries despite the new labels (Kumar 2004:112). Further, studies 
point to the negative environmental impact of the production, consumption 
and dismantling of knowledge goods and highlight the fact that these goods are 
extremely toxic and polluting (Zehle, 2001).  
 
Despite such inequalities in terms of the global control and distribution of 
knowledge the concept of the knowledge economy is widely used by 
corporations, policy makers and international organisations to legitimate a 
particular ideological agenda. From the early statistical studies the knowledge 
economy has been heralded as a stage of development that all countries will or 
should attain and knowledge itself has come to be valued only in terms of the 
degree to which it can be codified, measured, owned and traded. Further, it 
tends to place the focus on consumption and consumers rather than on citizens 
and users, on selling and buying rather than on informing and empowering. 
This is despite the fact that information networks, especially the internet, can 
empower receivers and decentre producers.  
 
However, producers have been greatly favoured by the politics of the 
knowledge economy. Even dominant lead firms such as Microsoft and Intel 
were assisted by the global support of the US government in establishing 
Wintelism as a global standard (Hart and Kim, 2001). Shadlen et al (2005) argue 
that an extensive and effective international institutional regime has emerged in 
software where the US, WTO and other related institutions promote the 
protection of intellectual property rights in a wide range of countries, with 
uncertain and worrying consequences for innovation and deeply unequal global 
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effects.  Ultimately, an imperialist and economistic approach to knowledge 
production and consumption not only limits and narrows our understanding of 
knowledge but threatens to devalue forms of knowledge and knowledge 
production which do not conform. 
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